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Abstract: »Die Influenza-Pandemie 1918/19 und COVID-19 in Irland und dem 
Vereinigten Königreich«. The global spread of the coronavirus pandemic has 
prompted inevitable comparisons with the flu pandemic of 1918–1920. How-
ever, in order for such comparisons to be fruitful, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the similarities between the two outbreaks and their differ-
ences. This paper compares different aspects of the “Spanish” flu and coro-
navirus pandemics in Ireland and the UK during the two periods. The first part 
of the paper provides a general overview, taking account of the nature of the 
two diseases and the contexts in which they occurred. The following two sec-
tions explore the extent to which both outbreaks exposed underlying social 
and economic inequalities and the measures taken by central and local gov-
ernment, as well as civil society, to combat the spread of disease. The final 
section examines the extent to which both pandemics highlighted existing 
failures and sparked demands to “build back better.” 
Keywords: “Spanish” flu, coronavirus, epidemics, inequality, health policy, 
reconstruction. 
1. Introduction 
At some point during the autumn of 2019, a new and highly infectious virus 
began circulating in the Chinese city of Wuhan, but the emergence of this 
new disease was not acknowledged officially until the last week of December, 
by which time it had already begun to spread to other parts of the world (Cal-
vert and Arbuthnott 2021, 32-3). We now know that the first COVID-related 
death occurred in the UK on 30 January 2020, even though this was only 
acknowledged publicly on 5 March (Calvert and Arbuthnott 2021, 51). In Ire-
land, the first case was detected formally on 26 February 2020 (Perumal, 
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Curran, and Hunter 2020) and the first COVID-related death was announced 
on 11 March (Cullen 2020). By 30 September 2021, the total number of deaths 
that had been directly associated with COVID-19 across the whole of the UK 
and Ireland was 141,919 (UK Health Security Agency 2021; Health Protection 
Surveillance Centre 2021). These deaths represented just under three per cent 
of the officially-recognised global number of COVID-related deaths at that 
point (JHU-CRC 2021). 
The coronavirus outbreak invited inevitable comparisons with the so-called 
“Spanish” flu pandemic, which occurred just over a century earlier. This was 
also a “novel” virus, which spread rapidly throughout the world, even without 
the additional “boost” supplied by the global aviation industry. It has been 
estimated that the total number of flu-related deaths across the whole of the 
UK and Ireland was likely to have been at least 245,000 (Johnson 2003, 137; 
Milne 2018, 81). The global number of deaths was likely to have ranged be-
tween 50 and 100 million (Johnson and Mueller 2002, 115). 
As the World Health Organization (WHO 2020, 87-96) acknowledged, we can 
gain a lot by studying the experience of past epidemics but, in order to do so, 
it is important to recognise not only their similarities but also their differ-
ences. This paper compares the experiences of the 1918/19 flu pandemic and 
the current coronavirus pandemic in both Ireland and the UK through three 
different lenses. We begin by providing a general overview of the main simi-
larities and differences between the two pandemics and the circumstances in 
which they occurred. Section two contains a more detailed analysis of the im-
pact of social and economic inequalities on mortality from the two diseases 
and section three looks at the full range of both official and unofficial re-
sponses. The final section examines the extent to which either or both of the 
two pandemics influenced debates about the need for social reconstruction 
or “building back better” (OECD 2020). 
2. Similarities and Dissimilarities 
Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, historians have weighed in on the 
implications of past experience for the present. Those with expertise in the 
1918/19 influenza pandemic were rapidly in demand with the media, which 
deemed the “Spanish flu” the obvious precedent thanks to its death count and 
global reach (Spinney 2020; Honigsbaum 2020; Bresalier 2020). Others (and 
not just those lacking such expertise) were more cautious, bridling at glib 
“lessons of history” exercises, and pointing out that all epidemics are distinct 
and of their time (Lachenal and Thomas 2020). From this early skirmish, fruit-
ful outcomes soon emerged, in dialogue with the evolving pandemic. As the 
woeful under-preparedness of the US and UK became apparent, contempo-
rary historians plausibly argued that path dependencies in public health 
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policies over recent decades were vital to understanding (Berridge 2020). 
When major cross-national disparities were recorded in mortality and mor-
bidity rates, and linked to the stringency of state intervention, the evidence 
of similar causalities in 1918 became more salient (Markel 2020; Bristow 
2020). As the longevity and grave social effects of the pandemic set in, so the 
ethnographic history pioneered by Charles Rosenberg, which seeks com-
monalities across all epidemics, became a focus of effective shared endeav-
our (WHO 2021; Rosenberg 1989). Historians therefore found a place in the 
public discourse. 
With respect to origin and initial circulation the comparison is at once banal 
and opaque. Banal, because it is a statement of the obvious to say that both 
viruses spread through dense human networks composed of the vectors of 
globalisation: trade, communication, conflict, leisure, and sociability. 
Opaque, because in neither case is place or cause of origin certain. Three 
main theses attend the arrival of the 1918/19 influenza. US-centric analysis 
treats as decisive early public health reporting of a severe flu outbreak in a 
poultry farming region of Kansas (Barry 2004). This is held to have spread in 
early 1918 to a nearby army camp, from where troop movements of First 
World War recruits carried the virus to Europe. British scholars instead argue 
that the massive military base camp in Étaples, France, was the site of the 
jump from animal to human, possibly in 1917 (Oxford et al. 2005). The prox-
imity of soldiers to live poultry, swine, and horses, coupled with leakage of 
stored phosgene and chlorine gases, provided optimal environmental condi-
tions. Finally, unverified plague death reports from Northern China in late 
1917 may actually have been the first sighting, in which case diffusion was 
likely through the Chinese Labour Corps, transported to the US and Europe 
(including to Étaples) to furnish ancillary manpower to Allied troops (Hum-
phries 2014). 
China also appears to be the primary locus of COVID-19’s emergence. The 
most widely accepted account proposes a species jump of the coronavirus 
from horseshoe bats to a wild animal, probably a pangolin (possibly a mink 
or cat), which was then shipped to Wuhan as game meat for sale at a wet mar-
ket (Joint WHO-China Study 2021). Others suspect it is more than coincidence 
that China’s main centre of virological research is geographically proximate 
to the Wuhan wet market, that experimental mutation programmes using bat 
coronaviruses were conducted there, and that the first recorded deaths were 
located between the Institute and the market (Calvert and Arbuthnott 2021, 
15-52; Joint WHO-China Study 2021, 118-20). Could there have been a labora-
tory leak? Virologists, often with vested interests, are divided on whether the 
genetic structure of SARS-CoV-2 bears evidence of human manipulation 
(Wade 2021). Meanwhile, no cognate wild coronavirus has yet been traced to 
validate the alternative “pangolin soup” thesis (Volpato et al. 2020). Nor have 
external experts been able to interrogate the records of the Wuhan 
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Virological Institute: Chinese state secrecy, compounded by American geo-
political sabre-rattling, further obscures the search. Determining whether 
the virus was natural misfortune or biosecurity disaster is perhaps immate-
rial though. Humanity has, after all, not yet proven capable of acting upon 
the obvious lesson of 1918/19, that war can be a crucible of devastating dis-
ease. 
The aetiology and symptoms of the two viruses were alike to the extent that 
respiratory difficulties were common features leading to death. Patients in 
1918/19 experienced the aching limbs and fever common to flu, with fatal out-
comes typically due to secondary bacterial pneumonia, which occurred after 
three or four days. Death followed soaring temperature, delirium, fluid filling 
the lungs, and heliotrope cyanosis, a discolouration of the head and feet due 
to lack of oxygen (Honigsbaum 2009, 16; Ministry of Health 1920, viii-ix). 
COVID-19 fatalities took a longer course, beginning with common early 
symptoms including aching limbs, constant coughing, sore throat, and anos-
mia, followed by gradual worsening of respiratory capacity that became crit-
ical after about one week. If breathing did not respond to oxygenation ther-
apy, death followed, typically between 12 and 18 days from onset (Zhou et al. 
2020; Hawryluk et al. 2020). 
There are of course other substantial differences between the two pandem-
ics as well, relating to the greater sophistication of virology and vaccinology 
today and to the elaborate welfare states through which governments now 
manage the response. The identity of the 1918/19 influenza was not estab-
lished contemporaneously (Humphreys 2018; Crosby 1989, 264-94). The fil-
tration technology which distinguishes virus from bacterium was barely es-
tablished, and initially scientists assumed that an influenza bacillus must be 
the causative agent (Wilkinson 1974). An ineffective vaccine was duly devel-
oped and deployed in some places (Eyler 2009). Only in March 1919 was la-
boratory infection using filter-passing agents achieved, thus demonstrating 
the viral cause. Nor was the zoonotic transmission of influenza yet under-
stood, with the isolation of the H1N1 virus in swine and humans first accom-
plished in the 1930s, and avian to human zoonosis established only in 1967. 
Archaeovirological investigation, first involving the exhumation of flu vic-
tims buried in the Alaskan permafrost, and more recently the genetic se-
quencing of 1918 autopsy samples, led in the 1990s to firmer conclusions. The 
1918 strain appears to have been a novel human influenza, H1N1, with avian 
flu-like features, rather than a reassortant virus (Taubenberger, Hultin, and 
Morens 2007). 
By contrast, the causative virus of COVID-19 was rapidly isolated from early 
patients in Wuhan, and sequencing established its homology with the coro-
navirus responsible for the Asian SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) 
outbreak in 2002. These results were shared internationally in January 2020 
and vaccine development began immediately, with that of Pfizer BioNTech 
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the first to receive validation from the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
December 2020, followed by Astra Zeneca (February 2021), then inter alia 
Moderna (April) and China’s Sinopharm (May) and Sinovac (June); Russia’s 
widely used Sputnik V was still awaiting approval on 13 October 2021. Produc-
tion and administering then accelerated, with about 36% of the world’s pop-
ulation (2.9 billion people) “fully vaccinated” (i.e., with two doses) by the mid-
dle of October 2021, albeit with great variations in levels of population 
coverage between, for example, United Arab Emirates (87%) and Portugal 
(86%) at one extreme and Cameroon (0.5%) and South Sudan (0.3%) at the 
other (JHU-CRC 2021). Social policies were also rapidly implemented, and alt-
hough some were novel, such as digital surveillance technologies, national 
responses were generally path dependent extrapolations of existing welfare 
regimes. Typically, this meant types of “emergency Keynesianism” in high- 
and middle-income countries, with tools such as income support, wage sub-
sidies, furlough schemes, and cash payments (Béland et al. 2021). Variation 
in response also depended on political institutions (federalism, presidential-
ism, etc.), regime types (democratic, despotic, etc.) and state capacity (Greer 
et al. 2020). For example, China’s authoritarian polity mobilised quickly, us-
ing existing bureaucratic systems successfully to impose strict lockdowns and 
population control (Mei 2020). 
Although influenza and COVID-19 are different diseases, both diseases ex-
hibited cyclical, or wave-like, features. In the UK, the first “wave” of pan-
demic influenza began in the summer of 1918, with a second and much larger 
wave in the autumn and a third wave towards the end of the following winter 
(Figure 1A). In the case of COVID-19, the first cases were recorded in the late-
winter and spring of 2020, although it is difficult to form an accurate estimate 
of the true number of cases in the absence of effective testing. This was fol-
lowed by a second wave in the autumn of 2020, sparked initially by a relaxa-
tion of lockdown arrangements followed by the emergence of a new variant, 
with a third wave in the autumn of 2021 (Institute for Government 2021; Par-
liamentary Papers 2021, paras. 133-4, 369). There were also two marked peaks 
in the numbers of deaths in the spring of 2020 and the winter of 2020/21. How-
ever, the link between infection and mortality appeared to have been broken 
by the introduction of a successful vaccination programme at the start of the 
new year (Figure 1B). 
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Figure 1A Influenza Deaths, 23/6/2018 – 18-10/5/2019 
 
Source: Parliamentary Papers (1920b, 78-80; Table X). For information on the monthly incidence 
of deaths in Scotland, see Parliamentary Papers (1919, Chart no. 1); and for Ireland, see Milne 
(2018, 61). 
Figure 1B New Cases and Deaths From COVID-19: England and Wales, 25/1/2020 
– 30/9/2021 
 
Source: ONS (2021a, 2021b). 
 
One of the most obvious differences between the two pandemics concerns 
their impact on different age groups. As several contemporaries observed, 
influenza normally recruited the majority of its victims among the elderly 

























































HSR Suppl. 33 (2021)  │  199 
view, one of the most frightening features of the “Spanish” flu pandemic was 
the fact that so many deaths were recorded among children and young adults 
(Figure 2B).1 In this respect, the age profile of COVID-19 deaths has much 
more in common with the normal pattern of flu deaths than with the pan-
demic of 1918/19. As we can see from Figure 2C, the COVID-19 pandemic has 
had a very minor effect on death rates at younger ages, with a much greater 
impact on those aged 60 and over (Figure 2C). 
Figure 2A Age-Specific Female Death Rates from Influenza: England and Wales, 
1914–1917 
 
Source: Parliamentary Papers (1920b, 8). 
 
1  The data shown in Figure 2B differ from those shown in the Registrar-General’s report. His fig-
ures were based on the number of deaths recorded in the final quarter of 1918 and were calcu-
lated by dividing the number of deaths by one-quarter of the estimated population figure (Par-
liamentary Papers 1920b, 8; see also Johnson 2006, 86). The current figures are based on the 
total number of deaths during the last three quarters of 1918 and the first quarter of 1919, di-
vided by the estimated mid-year population for 1918. For comparable information on the age-
structure of mortality in Scotland, see Parliamentary Papers 1919, 9, and Johnson 2004; and, 
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Figure 2B Age-Specific Female Death Rates from Influenza: England and Wales, 
1918–1919 
 
Source: Parliamentary Papers (1920a; 1920b, 9). 
Figure 2C Age-Specific Female Deathrates from COVID-19: England and Wales, 
2020 
 
Source: ONS (2021a, 2021b). 
 
These differences in the age-profile of mortality during the two pandemics 
have attracted considerable attention. In both cases, the high rates of mortal-
ity experienced by older age-groups are likely to reflect the fact that older in-
dividuals are more likely to experience comorbidities, such as pre-existing 
respiratory illness, obesity, and cardiovascular diseases, which lead to 
greater vulnerability (see section 2 below). However, the extra mortality ex-
perienced by young children and, especially, young adults, in 1918/19 has not 
yet been satisfactorily explained. Some writers have attributed this to the 
higher levels of economic activity and thus environmental exposure of this 
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that earlier influenza pandemics were decisive, either because previous ex-
posure had conferred a degree of immunity on those over 60 or had “dysreg-
ulated” the immune systems of those who caught it as children, making them 
more vulnerable to a cytokine storm (Taubenberger and Morens 2006; Nickol 
and Kindrachuk 2019; Langford 2002; Shanks and Brundage 2012; Gagnon et 
al. 2013). 
3. Inequality 
Although a lot of attention has been paid to the peculiar age-structure of mor-
tality in 1918/19, less attention has been paid to its socio-economic character-
istics. These factors may of course be related, insofar as high levels of mor-
tality among the fittest age-groups may have helped to divert attention from 
any greater susceptibility experienced by those living in the worst conditions. 
In Australia, the Railway Commissioners sought to dispel anxieties among 
tramway workers by explaining that “all sections of the community are liable 
to attack, and to approximately the same degree” (McCracken and Curson 
2003, 120). Edwin Jordan (1927, 475) argued that, in the United States, “the 
rich died as readily as the poor” (cited in Crosby 1989, 227). These sentiments 
were echoed in the official report of the Registrar-General for England and 
Wales in 1920. He concluded that, so far as London was concerned, “the mor-
tality of the late epidemic fell almost alike on the sanitarily just and on the 
unjust” and that there was “even less correlation of influenza mortality with 
wealth than […] health” (Parliamentary Papers 1920b, 29). 
However, even though some historians have continued to suggest that “the 
epidemic was remarkably democratic in its victims” (Tomkins 1992, 446), 
other writers have been more sceptical. As early as 1931, the US statistician, 
Edgar Sydenstricker (1931, 155), argued that “the lower the economic level, 
the higher […] the attack rate,” and these conclusions have been echoed, for 
different locations, by more recent commentators. McCracken and Curson 
(2003, 131) found that “while the epidemic affected all social groups [in the 
Australian city of Sydney; …] working-class and blue-collar workers experi-
enced the heaviest death rates.” Echeverri (2003, 189) argued that “poverty 
was an aggravating factor during the pandemic” in Spain and Mamelund 
(2006, 933) found that mortality in two socially-contrasting districts of the 
Norwegian city of Kristiania (Oslo) was inversely related to social class and 
directly associated with levels of overcrowding. Zylberman (2003, 199) found 
little direct evidence of lower mortality in the wealthier districts of Paris, but 
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he argued that this was because any underlying differences were obscured by 
the impact of domestic service on residential living patterns.2 
A number of writers have also revisited the statistics of mortality for the 
United Kingdom. In Dublin, Milne (2018, 69-76) found that mortality rates 
were at their highest among those who worked with the public, such as shop-
keepers, police, medical workers, bank officials, and priests. Johnson (2006, 
105-6) also reported that death rates were linked to occupational differences, 
although he highlighted the additional risks faced by “those whose work in-
volved ‘exposure to dirt and other respiratory risks.’” However, these occupa-
tional differences did not necessarily map onto conventional socio-economic 
hierarchies. Milne (2018, 71) concluded that “high death rates were not so 
much class-dependent as job-dependent,” whilst Johnson (2006, 105) found 
that “while […] there may be an element of class differential [… it] is not […] 
particularly strong.” 
In the absence of clear evidence of a social class gradient in mortality, re-
searchers have also examined geographical variations. In 1920, the Ministry 
of Health compared prewar death rates for the period 1911–1914 with influ-
enza death rates during each of the three pandemic waves. They concluded 
that “the prewar standardised death rate is substantially correlated with the 
influenza death rate of the summer quarter, less closely associated with the 
influenza death rates of the subsequent quarters” (Ministry of Health 1920, 
48). These conclusions have been partially reinforced by Pearce et al.’s (2011) 
analysis of the relationship between prewar mortality and pandemic mortal-
ity in 333 registration districts, but they also argued that pre-pandemic mor-
tality was “predictive in all three waves” after “extract[ing] geographical var-
iance” (92). They also hypothesised that this was related to underlying levels 
of deprivation.3 Bambra, Norman, and Johnson (2021) have suggested that 
similar factors are likely to account for the existence of a clear “north-south 
divide” in pandemic mortality across England and Wales and an association 
between flu mortality and population densities. 
As Bambra, Lynch, and Smith (2021, 8-9) have argued, the social patterning 
of morbidity and mortality from infectious diseases reflects the interaction of 
four separate forces: exposure, transmission, susceptibility, and vulnerabil-
ity. In the first instance, some people are more likely to be exposed to infec-
tions because of the environments in which they live and work and the people 
 
2  This may also help to explain the absence of any clear relationship between wealth and mortal-
ity in London, where the proportion of domestic servants was used as a proxy to measure the 
affluence of the city’s boroughs (Parliamentary Papers 1920b, 29). 
3  These findings may be open to question. In addition to controlling for geographical factors, 
Pearce et al. also introduced an interaction term to control for the possible effect of immunity 
on differences in mortality between the first and second waves. Their argument that prewar 
mortality rates reflected underlying patterns of social disadvantage was based on an analogy 
with the relationship between deprivation and mortality in the 1980s (see Eames, Ben-Shlomo, 
and Marmot 1993). 
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with whom they come into contact. The influence of these factors is likely to 
be compounded if they live or work in crowded or poorly-ventilated condi-
tions, which make transmission more likely. Third, some people are more sus-
ceptible to infection because their immune systems have been compromised 
by psycho-social stress or by poor nutrition or living conditions. Finally, they 
can also be more vulnerable to infection if they have underlying health condi-
tions. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the clearest indications of differen-
tial exposure to infection was provided by the statistics of occupational mor-
tality (Figures 3A and 3B). As in 1918/19, some people were more likely to be-
come infected because they worked in industries that brought them into 
closer contact with other people, such as those employed in caring or service 
occupations, or because their jobs made it much more difficult to work from 
home, such as those employed in “elementary” occupations, such as clean-
ing, security, or shelf-stacking. The figures also show how the impact of these 
factors varied by sex, in that the occupational gradient in mortality was more 
marked among males than females, and overall male death rates were also 
higher. 
As influenza and coronavirus are both droplet infections (Centers for Dis-
ease Control 2021), one might have expected them to be transmitted in similar 
ways. In 1918/19, it was widely expected that the pandemic would spread 
more rapidly in overcrowded households, but contemporary researchers 
found surprisingly little evidence of this (Ministry of Health 1920: 164-72).4 
However, there is stronger evidence of a link between overcrowding and the 
spread of coronavirus. A review published in December 2020 concluded that 
“higher COVID-19 mortality rates in areas with higher levels of deprivation 
are partly related to household overcrowding,” partly because overcrowded 
households were more likely to contain members of multiple generations and 
partly because closer proximity was likely to impose a higher “viral load” 
(Marmot et al. 2020, 28). 
 
4  This does not mean that they therefore excluded overcrowding as a contributing factor. After 
acknowledging the problems caused by inadequate data, they concluded that “what has been 
adduced does no more than make it improbable that domestic overcrowding can be deemed a 
principal factor of the spread of epidemic influenza” (Ministry of Health 1920, 172; emphasis in 
original). 
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Figure 3A COVID-19: Occupational Mortality Rates, England & Wales, 2020 (Males, 
20-64) 
 
Figure 3B COVID-19: Occupational Mortality Rates, England & Wales, 2020 
(Females, 20-64) 
 
Notes: Standard Occupational Classifications (SOCs) are as follows: 1: Managers, Directors and 
Senior Officials; 2: Professional Occupations; 3: Associate Professional and Technical Occupations; 
4: Administrative and Secretarial Occupations; 5: Skilled Trades Occupations; 6: Caring, Leisure 
and Other Service Occupations; 7: Sales and Customer Service Occupations; 8: Process, Plant and 
Machine Operatives; 9: Elementary Occupations. Deaths were recorded during the period 9 March-
28 December 2020. 
Source: ONS (2021). 
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The COVID-19 pandemic has also exposed the ways in which some individu-
als – and groups of individuals – may be more susceptible to infection than 
others. This may be because they have lower levels of resistance, as a result 
of poorer nutrition, or because their immune systems have been compro-
mised, possibly as a result of psychosocial factors (see also Bambra, Lynch, 
and Smith 2021, 32). In their review of the relationship between inequality 
and health during the pandemic, Marmot et al. (2020, 44) argued that “higher 
levels of stress” were among the factors contributing to disproportionate 
rates of mortality from COVID-19 among members of particular ethnic mi-
norities. 
During the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, a number of studies 
highlighted the high proportion of deaths occurring among individuals with 
pre-existing health conditions. As Marmot et al. (2020, 19) reported, “the av-
erage number of pre-existing conditions for deaths involving COVID-19 be-
tween March and June 2020 was 2.1 for those aged 0 to 69 years and 2.3 for 
those aged 70 years and over.” The most common conditions were dementia, 
diabetes, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, and other chronic diseases 
such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and chronic kidney disease. 
Some of these diseases were associated with COVID-19 deaths because they 
were common within the age-groups at which COVID-19 deaths were most 
likely to occur but others, such as diabetes, also seem to have been aggravat-
ing factors in all age-groups. However, Marmot and his colleagues also ob-
served that the prevalence of these underlying conditions was itself related to 
socio-economic factors. 
Contemporary researchers have also paid particular attention to differ-
ences in mortality rates by ethnic group. As Marmot et al. (2020, 38-46) 
pointed out, members of particular ethnic minorities are more likely to be 
employed in occupations with high levels of COVID-19 exposure, and they are 
also more likely to live in overcrowded households and to have underlying 
health conditions. All of these factors are reflected in their mortality experi-
ence. These variations are apparent among both men and women, but they 
are especially prevalent among men. As we can see from Figure 4, the age-
standardised mortality rates for males of Black African, Pakistani, and Bang-
ladeshi origin were more than double the equivalent rates for those identify-
ing as “white British.” 
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Figure 4 Ethnicity and Mortality from COVID-19: England and Wales, 2020/21 
 
Notes: The data are age-standardised mortality rates for men and women aged 30-100 and refer 
to deaths which occurred between 24 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. 
Source: ONS (2021b), Updating ethnic contrasts in Deaths involving the coronavirus (COVID-19), 
England: 24 January 2020 to 31 March 2021. 
 
As this account has suggested, one of the characteristic features which under-
pins the social patterning of COVID-19 mortality is the interaction of different 
forms of inequality. Bambra, Lynch, and Smith (2021, 7-8) have used the term 
“syndemic” to describe these interactions. As Singer et al. (2017, 941) ex-
plained, “syndemics involve the adverse interaction between diseases and 
health conditions of all types […] and are most likely to emerge under condi-
tions of health inequality caused by poverty, stigmatisation, stress or struc-
tural violence.” In 2020 and 2021, the starkest illustration of the impact of 
these factors was provided by statistics which compared the incidence of 
mortality from COVID-19 with an index of multiple deprivation (Ministry of 
Housing, Communities and Local Government 2019). In 1918/19, contempo-
rary researchers argued that there was no consistent relationship between 
“wealth” and mortality but, in 2020 and 2021, mortality among those living in 
the most deprived parts of England was more than double the equivalent 
rates for those living in the least deprived areas (Figures 5A and 5B).5 
 
5  Similar results were also reported for Scotland. See Priestley 2021. 
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Figure 5A Age-Standardised Male Mortality Rates (COVID-19) by Deprivation 
Deciles: England, 2020 
 
Figure 5B Age-Standardised Female Mortality Rates (COVID-19) by Deprivation 
Deciles: England, 2020 
 
Notes: The graphs are based on the Index of Multiple Deprivation, which is used to rank areas on 
the basis of a range of deprivation indicators. The bottom ten per cent of areas (“1”) are the most 
deprived and the top ten per cent (“10”) the least deprived. The figures are based on the number 
of deaths associated with COVID-19 between 1 March 2020 and 31 July 2020. 
Source: ONS (2020), Table 3. 
 
As we shall see in the following section of this paper, one of the main differ-
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experience of COVID-19 is that much more effort has been made during the 
current pandemic to suppress the circulation of the virus by social re-
strictions. These measures have undoubtedly helped to reduce the spread of 
infection, but they have also created new difficulties (see also Bambra, Lynch, 
and Smith 2021, 35-53). In the first place, they may have helped to exacerbate 
the impact of existing inequalities because it has often been easier for those 
living in more affluent circumstances to observe these restrictions because 
they enjoy better living conditions and are employed in occupations that fa-
cilitate remote working. However, the introduction of restrictions also in-
creased levels of social isolation and many researchers have argued that this 
has not only created mental health problems but done so in ways that are 
themselves socially-patterned. As the authors of one official survey ex-
plained,  
analysis has found that some groups have been more likely to experience 
poor or deteriorating [mental health] symptoms during the pandemic. 
These groups include women, young adults […] adults with pre-existing 
mental or physical health conditions, adults experiencing loss of income or 
employment, adults in deprived neighbourhoods, some ethnic minority 
populations and those who experienced local lockdowns. (Public Health 
England 2021) 
4. Management and Control 
During 1918, the central authorities in both Ireland and Britain failed to pro-
duce a coherent policy for or official guidance on influenza. The central bod-
ies who should have borne this responsibility were the Local Government 
Boards in England and Wales (LGB), Scotland (LGBS), and Ireland (LGBI). The 
LGB’s Chief Medical Officer, Arthur Newsholme, acknowledged these short-
comings at the Royal Society of Medicine (Newsholme 1919). He admitted that 
more could have been done especially during the first wave of the pandemic. 
Although measures should have been taken to isolate the sick, prevent mass 
migrations, and reduce overcrowding, he believed that this was not an option 
due to the demands of war as “it was necessary to carry on and the relentless 
needs of warfare justified incurring the risk of spreading infections” (Eyler 
1997, 268-9). It was therefore left to the local authorities (LAs) and their Med-
ical Officers of Health (MOHs) to take responsibility for public health in their 
respective towns and cities and it was the MOHs in particular who were 
tasked with the production of an influenza policy for the management of the 
disease. This meant that it was very much at the discretion of the MOH as to 
what preventive measures were to be put in place in their towns. In Ireland, 
it was the Poor Law medical system of the union infirmary and dispensary 
districts – administered by Boards of Guardians (BOGs) – that was responsible 
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for the administration of public medical care. The LGBI controlled the activ-
ities of the BOGs in relation to the administration of the dispensary medical 
system, union infirmaries, and fever hospitals. It also controlled the admin-
istration of the Public Health Acts by the rural, urban, and county councils 
(Parliamentary Papers 1920c, 4). 
The first wave of influenza, which occurred in the summer of 1918, was con-
sidered to be a mild wave in both Britain and Ireland. Even though this out-
break was relatively mild, it was held responsible for approximately 12,000 
deaths in England and Wales and a further 1,240 deaths in Scotland (Parlia-
mentary Papers 1920b, 7; Ministry of Health 1920, 51) and caused havoc as 
businesses were forced to close or function on reduced staff, with transport 
and other services disrupted. Nevertheless, and maybe not surprisingly, the 
public health officials treated this outbreak like a seasonal influenza and, 
therefore, did not respond with preventive or indeed therapeutic recommen-
dations for their citizens. However, as influenza returned for a second and 
third wave, the LA response through their public health and sanitary officials 
was more apparent and also more consistent as many of the LAs took similar 
preventive measures (Honigsbaum 2009, 35-150). 
Most LAs throughout Britain and Ireland recommended the closure of 
schools and technical colleges (Johnson 2006, 129). However, this was only a 
recommendation and some Irish secondary schools, such as the Methodist 
College in Belfast and the Friends’ School in Lisburn, remained open with 
tragic consequences (Marsh 2021, 232-4). In London, schools remained open 
unless they had to close due to staff absenteeism (Tomkins 1992, 448; Tanner 
2002, 55). The closure and ventilation of cinemas concerned many LAs. Alt-
hough the LGB did react in this instance by producing regulations on duration 
of performance and ventilation of premises, cinema closure was not en-
dorsed (Johnson 2006, 127). Public notices were produced by LAs in some 
British and Irish towns, with advice taken from the memoranda sent out to 
MOHs by the LGB in late October 1918. These contained lists of precautions 
to avoid influenza. They recommended avoiding crowds, as well as thorough 
cleanliness, free ventilation, and isolation of patients, all placing responsibil-
ity for prevention of influenza on the individual rather than preventive 
measures that the LAs would take themselves (Marsh 2021, 251-3). Attend-
ance at “wakes” was a big problem in Ireland.6 The gathering of people in 
confined crowded houses in both rural and urban areas of Ireland facilitated 
the spread of the virus and was of concern to public health officials through-
out the country (Marsh 2021, 53-7). As a result, LAs in both Newry and Bally-
clare produced public notices prohibiting wakes, as well as recommending 
the prompt burial of influenza victims. Again, the LAs depended on the LGBI 
 
6  “Waking the dead” was an Irish tradition where family, friends and neighbours of the deceased 
would gather, usually in the deceased’s house in advance of the official funeral and burial. This 
gathering would often be accompanied by “hospitality.” 
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to be able to enforce these recommendations, but this authority was not forth-
coming (Marsh 2021, 251-3). 
Influenza was not made a notifiable disease anywhere in the United King-
dom (UK), and in Ireland the LGBI decided that influenza should not be added 
to the list of notifiable diseases as they believed, probably correctly, that it 
would not curtail its spread (Parliamentary Papers 1920c, xxxvii-xxxviii). Nev-
ertheless, the LAs of Larne and Belfast made septic pneumonia notifiable 
during the second wave, mandating certain measures to be put into place re-
garding the notification, isolation, and treatment of the disease (Marsh 2021, 
252). The wearing of masks in both Britain and Ireland was not a compulsory 
measure. Although some MOHs, such as James Niven in Manchester and 
Maxwell Williamson in Edinburgh (Van Hartesveldt 1992, 99; Scotsman 1919) 
advocated the use of masks, their use did not catch on more widely (Johnson 
2006, 120). There is little evidence of widespread use of masks in Ireland 
(Marsh 2021, 142). 
Vaccines too were problematic. Several British and Irish laboratories made 
vaccines, usually based on streptococcus, pneumococcus, and Pfeiffer’s Bacil-
lus (now known as a type of haemophilus influenzae bacillus or HIB); as these 
were bacteria (contemporary medical science understood influenza to be a 
bacterial rather than viral infection), their efficacy would have been limited, 
except possibly against secondary bacterial infections. The LGB made several 
alternative vaccines available but their use was limited due to lack of speci-
ficity (Johnson 2006, 145). In Ireland, the LGBI expressed doubt that inocula-
tion with the proposed vaccines would confer immunity from an influenza 
attack (Parliamentary Papers 1920c, xxxviii). As a result, they did not advocate 
the use of vaccination or supply vaccines to BOGs for use in the treatment of 
influenza, but this may have had more to do with the cost of the vaccines than 
their effectiveness as a treatment. 
Despite the high death tolls and levels of infection, people continued with 
their normal lives, attending work unless sickness prevented them from do-
ing so. Schools, libraries, and other public buildings closed, especially during 
November 1918 (Marsh 2021, 165), but businesses such as factories only 
closed if forced to do so due to staff shortages and not as a preventive measure 
to stop the spread of disease (Marsh 2021, 253). There were shortages of med-
ical personnel as many doctors and nurses were away at war, which meant 
that Irish BOGs struggled to find replacement nurses (Marsh 2011, 211-2). 
Many workhouse infirmaries were unable to recruit professional nurses and 
depended on the largesse of local ladies who volunteered their services to 
help (Marsh 2011, 212). In London, one LA reported that as most households 
were affected by influenza, they were unable to rely on the service of women 
who would normally have volunteered to help in this situation as they were 
nursing their own family members who were ill (Tomkins 1992, 450). Re-
placement doctors were also difficult to source and those physicians 
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remaining in the Irish Poor Law dispensary service struggled to cope with the 
huge numbers requiring their services; their medical officers paid in excess 
of 100,000 extra home visits compared to the year preceding the pandemic 
(Parliamentary Papers 1920c, xxvi; Marsh 2011, 208). This resulted in the 
forced closure of some dispensaries, leaving the local poor with no medical 
help to treat the disease (Marsh 2021, 253). Some union infirmaries were filled 
to capacity, unable to accommodate and treat influenza sufferers, so helping 
families in need of food, fuel, and nursing was not a consideration (Marsh 
2021, 253). In Manchester, the Public Health Committee – aware of the gravity 
of the situation – supplied additional nurses, provided domestic assistance 
where needed in the city, and supplied food and coal for those people unable 
to provide the same for themselves due to influenza (Johnson 2006, 133). Sim-
ilar action was taken in several London boroughs by councils that also recog-
nised the limitations of just having preventive measures to deal with influ-
enza (Ministry of Health 1920, 483; Tomkins 1992, 450). In Ireland, such 
provision was largely provided by philanthropic organisations: for example, 
in towns such as Cookstown, Newry, and Clones, middle class residents pro-
vided money via subscription lists as well as volunteering their services to 
help their neighbours (Marsh 2011, 217-9). In other towns such as Rathvilly, 
Co Carlow, and Straffan, Co Kildare, local landlords provided soup for the 
poor and sick, helping to save lives (Fennell and Bunbury 2006, 140; Milne 
2018, 37). 
The LGB provided little guidance to LAs on influenza apart from two mem-
oranda produced in November 1918 (Johnson 2006, 128). They often shifted 
the responsibility back to the LA when queried about a proposed course of 
action. In both Britain and Ireland, the LGB and LGBI’s main input concerned 
the sanctioning of remuneration – often not without a complaint – for tempo-
rary medical staff needed for the infirmaries and dispensary districts 
throughout the country (Tomkins 1992, 451; Milne 2018, 104). LAs in Britain 
and Ireland were unprepared and ill-equipped to respond to the scale of this 
public health catastrophe and depended on guidance from the LGB and LGBI, 
guidance that they seemed reluctant to provide. This resulted in a response 
that lacked any cohesion and consistency resulting in high death tolls 
throughout Ireland, England, Wales, and Scotland. 
So how does this compare to the present ongoing pandemic of COVID-19? 
During the early years of the 21st century, the UK Government issued a series 
of plans to deal with possible pandemic outbreaks, but these were all based 
on the assumption that the “next” great pandemic would be an influenza pan-
demic, with the result that little attempt was made to anticipate the risks as-
sociated with other potentially pandemic diseases (Whitty 2018; 
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Parliamentary Papers 2021, paras. 20-2).7 This limitation was compounded – 
at least in the UK – by a scaling down of pandemic preparations in the years 
since 2016, when the last pandemic influenza simulation exercise – Operation 
Cygnus – occurred (Calvert and Arbuthnott 2021, 81-106). So, in early 2020, as 
news of the virus in the Wuhan region of China seeped out to the wider world, 
both governments watched but neither took any immediate action. On 23 Jan-
uary 2020, Wuhan province locked down to stop the spread of the virus and a 
week later, on 29 January, the first two COVID-19 cases in the UK were con-
firmed as Chinese nationals who were family members staying in a hotel in 
York (Calvert and Arbuthnott 2021, 64). In Ireland, the first diagnosed case of 
COVID-19 was that of a middle-aged woman who had returned from Northern 
Italy on 17 February 2020 (Perumal et al. 2020, 128). These cases heralded the 
beginning of the pandemic in both Ireland and the UK, but their governments 
were slow to respond to the threat of COVID-19. 
There have been a number of important political changes in the UK and 
Ireland since 1918, not least the partition of Ireland in 1921 and creation of 
Northern Ireland (NI) and the Republic of Ireland (Ireland). Both countries 
introduced major health service reforms after the Second World War, with 
the passage of the National Health Service Acts in England and Wales and 
Scotland in 1946 and 1947, the Health Services (Northern Ireland) Act in 1948, 
and the introduction of the Irish Health Acts in 1947 and 1953 (Elder 1953; 
Webster 1988, 94-107; Considine and Dukelow 2009, 253-6). In recent years, 
there has been an enhanced level of national devolution within the UK with 
the establishment of the Welsh Assembly and the re-establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament, alongside the Northern Irish Assembly (Stewart 2004). 
This in itself has led to mixed messages on the restrictions for prevention of 
the spread of COVID-19 throughout the UK. The restrictions laid out by the 
British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, only applied to England and were not 
necessarily the same as those issued by the First Ministers for Scotland, 
Wales, and NI (see, e.g., Parliamentary Papers 2021, para. 144). Each de-
volved government produced its own set of COVID-19 restrictions and lock-
down plans, based on those for England but with differing timescales for go-
ing into and coming out of the first lockdown in 2020, as well as for re-
entering lockdowns in late 2020 and early 2021. On the island of Ireland, there 
are two jurisdictions of Ireland and NI. This created further confusion on 
rules around restrictions of movement during lockdowns and subsequent 
plans and timescales for lifting of these restrictions on the island of Ireland 
(see, e.g., McCormack 2020). 
 
7  This is not to say that pandemic preparation plans focused exclusively on influenza. In February 
2016, Public Health England carried out a simulation exercise in relation to a possible outbreak 
of MERS-CoV (Exercise Alice). A heavily-redacted copy of the ensuing report was finally released 
in October 2021 (McKee 2021b). 
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Unlike in 1918, central government rather than local authorities have been 
responsible for public health policy for the prevention of spread of COVID-
19. The LAs in Scotland, Wales, and NI followed the rules and recommenda-
tions laid down by their respective executives. The overall message through-
out Great Britain and NI especially during the first lockdown was “Stay Home 
- Protect the NHS - Save Lives” (Parliamentary Papers 2021, para. 144). In Ire-
land, there was a similar message: “Stay Home - Stay Safe - Protect each other” 
(Government of Ireland 2020). The main fear in the UK and Ireland was that 
their health services would be overwhelmed and unable to cope with the 
number of critical cases as had occurred in other European countries such as 
Spain, Italy, and France. In early March 2020, it was clear that the health ser-
vices in these countries were struggling. Therefore, both the Irish and British 
publics were told to stay at home and only go out for essential purposes to 
protect their health services. In both Ireland and the UK, the first lockdown 
occurred towards the end of March 2020. During this lockdown, schools, uni-
versities, and businesses closed. Those who could work from home did so and 
those whose businesses closed were placed on furlough (UK Revenue and 
Customs 2020; Department of Social Protection 2020). All public gatherings 
were forbidden, cinemas and theatres were closed, sports events cancelled, 
church services were not allowed, and funerals took place but with minimal 
attendance (Parliamentary Papers 2021, paras. 75-162; Brennan 2021). 
Public notices along with television and radio campaigns spread the public 
health message concerning COVID-19 to “Stay Home and Save Lives.” These 
campaigns used concise, punchy language along with bright and eye-catch-
ing posters to spread the message to the public. The advice included keeping 
a social distance of two metres, not touching your face, coughing or sneezing 
into your elbow, washing your hands well and often, and using face coverings 
in enclosed spaces such as shops or on public transport (see, e.g., Govern-
ment of Ireland 2020). As in 1918, these recommendations placed the respon-
sibility firmly on the individual to keep themselves and more importantly oth-
ers safe. The intention was to make the public aware of how the virus spread 
and what precautions they should take to avoid spreading or catching it. 
The UK Government faced much criticism over its pandemic response. 
Early in the pandemic, the government was faced with a PPE crisis as there 
was an inadequate amount of PPE available to the NHS and social care pro-
viders. Pictures of NHS staff wearing bin bags as PPE appeared in the press 
and on social media, highlighting the urgent need for supplies (Press 2020). 
However, this was a global problem, so the race was on with other countries 
to buy sufficient supplies. The operation of the procurement process by the 
UK Government was astonishingly bad. Vast sums of money were spent buy-
ing supplies of PPE that were not fit for purpose. One of the main concerns 
was how that money was being spent. It appeared that some providers with 
political connections to the government but little or no experience of 
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supplying PPE were granted contracts (Calvert and Arbuthnott 2021, 288-9). 
Much of what was procured during 2020 was unusable and the government 
bought far more than was needed, without considering how it would be dis-
tributed (McKee 2021a). 
Another failure by the government was the development of a test and trace 
service in the UK. Thirty-seven billion pounds of taxpayers’ money was given 
to Serco and other private companies to run the test and trace service for Eng-
land and Wales, which through a failure of design was unsuccessful (Parlia-
mentary Papers 2021, paras. 163-245). Again, this was seen by many as “allo-
cation of contracts to friends of the Conservative government” (Czauderna et 
al. 2021). Although each country eventually produced a “test and trace” app, 
there is no overall system for the four countries of the UK. The “NHS COVID-
19” app eventually came into use in England and Wales on 24 September 2020, 
six months after the beginning of the first lockdown. The “Protect Scotland” 
app for Scotland was launched on 10 September 2020. In NI, the “StopCOVID 
NI” app was launched in July 2020 as was the Irish “COVID Tracker” app. The 
Scottish and Northern Irish apps were based on the same technology as that 
of the Irish app but were not initially compatible with the “NHS COVID-19” 
app (Digital Health 2021). This meant that the NI or Scottish apps were of no 
use in England and Wales and vice-versa. 
Faced with these shortcomings, the UK Government has been anxious to re-
focus attention onto the early success of its COVID-19 vaccination pro-
gramme (see, e.g., Topping 2021). In 2020–2021, several vaccines were devel-
oped. Pfizer/BioNTech, AstraZeneca, and Moderna vaccines were approved by 
the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency for use in the UK 
between 2 December 2020 and 8 January 2021 (NHS 2021).8 Two doses of these 
vaccines were required to give a high level of efficacy of between 90 and 95 
per cent. The rollout of the vaccination programme in the four UK Countries 
was achieved by using the organisational resources of the NHS rather than 
transferring this responsibility to the private sector as had been the case with 
the “Test and Trace” app. This enormous task has been delivered by NHS cli-
nicians and administrators as well as many volunteers throughout the UK 
(Parliamentary Papers 2021, para. 372). By the end of September 2021, 85.5 
per cent of people over the age of 12 had received a first vaccine dose and 78.6 
per cent had been double-vaccinated (UK Health Security Agency 2021). Ire-
land’s vaccine rollout was initially slower than that of the UK but, by 10 Octo-
ber 2021, 89.5 per cent of those aged 12 and over had received a first dose and 
87.8 per cent had received a second dose (Health and Safety Executive 2021). 
By the end of September 2021, the UK death toll was 136,399, including 
119,187 deaths in England, 8,726 in Scotland, 5,923 in Wales, and 2,563 in 
Northern Ireland (UK Health Security Agency 2021). In Ireland, the death toll 
 
8  The single-dose Janssen vaccine was approved for use on 28 May 2021 but has not yet been 
made available in the UK (19 October 2021). 
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was 5,249 (Health Protection Surveillance Centre 2021). The UK has one of the 
highest death rates in the world and Ireland had the highest rate of corona-
virus infection in the week ending 10 January 2021 (O’Leary 2021). So why, 
with lockdowns in place and clear public information campaigns, was this 
the case? This could be due to a number of factors. Initial cases of COVID-19 
in both Ireland and the UK were due to foreign travel. Despite this, both coun-
tries failed to impose (early) restrictions on foreign travel or to quarantine 
foreign nationals, either of which might otherwise have helped to curtail the 
spread of infection. There was also an unwillingness of central government 
in Ireland and the UK to lockdown sooner or more rigorously, while some 
think that restrictions may have been eased too soon. These factors, along 
with the UK Government initiative in August 2020 to encourage people to go 
back to work and “Eat out to Help Out” may have permitted the infection rates 
in both the UK and Ireland to continue to rise through late 2020 meaning that 
they had to introduce new lockdowns that started in December 2020 and con-
tinued through the first quarter of 2021 (Parliamentary Papers 2021, para. 
128). 
During 2021, the rise of variants of the disease such as the Delta variant 
slowed down the various plans to come out of lockdowns but on 19 July 2021, 
England removed all lockdown restrictions to open up the country, in what 
became known as “freedom day.” On the same day there was a surge of 
COVID-19 infections and both the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, and the 
Chancellor of Exchequer, Rishi Sunak, had to self-isolate (James 2021). Alt-
hough the majority of lockdown restrictions were subsequently lifted in 
Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Ireland as well, only time will tell if 
“freedom day” was a premature step or not. 
5. Reconstruction 
Outbreaks of epidemic disease have often been regarded as “shocks,” which 
highlight limitations in existing social arrangements and prompt demands 
for far-reaching change. As James Kay (1832, 4) explained at the time of the 
UK’s first cholera outbreak in 1832, “the introduction […] of a singularly ma-
lignant contagious malady which […] is chiefly propagated amongst those 
whose health is depressed by disease, mental anxiety or want of the comforts 
and conveniences of life has directed public attention to an investigation of 
the state of the poor.” However, as this episode also demonstrated, there was 
no guarantee that reform would follow speedily. It took another 16 years for 
the UK Government to authorise the creation of a General Board of Health in 
England and Wales and a further 18 years before the “grammar of common 
sanitary legislation” acquired what the first Chief Medical Officer, Sir John 
Simon, called “an imperative mood” (Harris 2004, 104-13; Wohl 1983, 156). 
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In 1918/19, one of the most important ways in which the flu pandemic might 
have influenced subsequent events was through its impact on the struggle for 
Irish independence. Ida Milne (2018, 198-224) highlighted the ways in which 
Irish nationalists incorporated the pandemic into their campaigning activi-
ties by drawing public attention to the impact of influenza within nationalist 
communities, the treatment received by infected prisoners in Ireland, and 
the threat posed by influenza to the health of political leaders who had been 
interned in Great Britain. The inadequate response of the LGBI, which was 
“the most powerful organ of the British administration in Ireland” may have 
also helped to encourage nationalist sentiment (Milne 2018, 232). It is difficult 
to disentangle the impact of these factors from those of other historical 
events, but Milne’s overall conclusion was that the incarceration of Irish na-
tionalists came to symbolise “the bondage of their country” and, in that con-
text, “the outbreaks of influenza among internees and political prisoners in 
British and Irish jails […] enhanced the opportunity to publicise that bondage 
and to play on public opinion at a crucial time in Irish political history” (Milne 
2018, 221). 
The pandemic also raised questions about the adequacy of many of the UK’s 
administrative structures and may therefore have contributed to processes of 
administrative reform at the end of the First World War. As Honigsbaum 
(1970, 50-1) showed, in England and Wales there was a longstanding cam-
paign to replace the Local Government Board and the National Health Insur-
ance Commission with a single Ministry of Health, and the flu pandemic may 
have provided an additional boost to this. The Irish Public Health Council 
published a damning critique of the LGBI in 1920. The report made no direct 
reference to the pandemic, but it highlighted many of the flaws which had 
also characterised the Board’s response to the pandemic in the previous two 
years (Milne 2018, 233-6). The pandemic may also have contributed, either 
directly or indirectly, to the formation of the Scottish Board of Health in 1919, 
although this is an issue for further research.9 
The pandemic also prompted a number of broader reflections, although 
their impact on subsequent policy also requires further investigation. Alt-
hough contemporary analysts failed to find any direct evidence of a correla-
tion between economic or social conditions and the pattern of pandemic mor-
tality, they had little doubt that pandemic influenza was, ultimately, a social 
disease. As two of the Ministry of Health’s Medical Officers observed in 1920, 
“no technical device of the sanitarian, no resource of the laboratory can have 
 
9  Hogarth (1987, 177) referred briefly to the fact that the demobilisation of Scottish GPs in No-
vember 1918 enabled them “to cope with the influenza pandemic that was sweeping the coun-
try” but made no reference to the pandemic as a factor in the formation of the Scottish Board 
of Health. Jenkinson (2002, 43) noted that “the path towards the creation of the Scottish Board 
of Health […] was protracted” but made no reference to any role which the pandemic might 
have played in this. 
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any effect in the reduction of death and sickness from epidemic or even en-
demic disease at all commensurate with the consequences which must follow 
a universal improvement of the standard and conditions of life” (Ministry of 
Health 1920, 193; emphasis in original). They were also anxious to emphasise 
that this was an international as much as a national issue: “To realise that the 
material wellbeing of the inhabitants of a foreign – perhaps even a hostile – 
country is a pressing concern of ours […] is a hard truth. Any supranational 
organisation for the control of epidemics will need to face it” (Ministry of 
Health 1920, xix, 192). 
The COVID-19 pandemic has also prompted a degree of soul-searching. 
During the early stages of the pandemic, several observers drew analogies 
with the sense of national emergency and solidarity associated with the Sec-
ond World War. This was not only reflected in appeals to wartime songs, such 
as “We’ll meet again” (BBC 2020a), but also to earlier proposals for social re-
form. In the first months of the pandemic, two social scientists, Richard Wil-
kinson and Kate Pickett (2020), cited Richard Titmuss’s (1958) famous essay 
on war and social policy to show how great national emergencies could be a 
launching pad for more egalitarian policies. The social entrepreneur, Hilary 
Cottam (2020, 4), made repeated references to the wartime social reformer, 
William Beveridge, in her call for “the creation of a new social settlement – 
one that can address the very different social, economic technological and 
ecological crises of today.”10 The Leader of the Labour Party, Keir Starmer 
(2021, 5, 9), sought to invoke similar memories when he asserted that “mod-
ern Britain has always emerged from the most difficult periods […] with a 
hunger to […] create a better country” and that “it is impossible to live in this 
moment and not feel the winds of change blowing, just as they did in 1945 and 
1997.” 
Many of these calls have been echoed in official statements and commit-
ments. In April 2020, the First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, argued 
that “when things come apart, there is always the opportunity to put them 
back together differently” (Scottish Government 2020) and, in October 2020, 
the Welsh First Minister, Mark Drakeford, argued that “part of [our] response 
to the virus is the need to think and plan ahead” (Welsh Government 2020, 2). 
In March 2021, the UK Government issued its own plan to “build back better.” 
The plan outlined a series of commitments to invest in infrastructure, skills, 
and innovation with a view to “level[ling] up the whole of the UK, support[ing] 
the transition to Net Zero [carbon emissions and] support[ing] our vision for 
Global Britain” (HM Treasury 2021, 13-4). The government also promised to 
devote particular attention to the reform of health and social care (HM Gov-
ernment 2021), although critics pointed out that the plan for social care 
 
10  For references to Beveridge, see Cottam 2020, 5, 14, 23, 34, 37, 40. 
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seemed to be more concerned with capping the costs incurred by the better 
off than improving the service as a whole (Hansard 2021). 
One of the main difficulties in assessing the impact of the flu pandemic on 
the development of social policy after 1918 is the fact that the pandemic oc-
curred towards the end of the First World War and that, despite its enormous 
demographic impact, it may nevertheless have been overshadowed by the 
termination of hostilities (Johnson 2006, 180). Although there were many ad-
vocates for “reconstruction” in 1918, many others favoured a “return to nor-
malcy,” and this was reflected in the character of the government, which was 
returned to power after the 1918 General Election (Harris 2004, 180-1). The 
government’s plans may also have been disrupted by the economic problems 
which affected many parts of the country from 1920 onwards, although its 
response to these problems might itself have been very different if the war 
had not occurred (Harris 2004, 202-3). 
Although the coronavirus pandemic did not occur at a time when the UK 
was embroiled in a global military conflict, it did take place in the aftermath 
of a highly-bruising debate over the merits (or otherwise) of leaving the Eu-
ropean Union (Sobolewska and Ford 2020), and many of the tensions that had 
been noted in 1918 between the advocates of change and the advocates of nor-
mality could also be recognised. Although the country’s Prime Minister has 
often sought to distance himself from the austerity policies of the previous 
decade, his Chancellor is widely regarded as a strong advocate for fiscal or-
thodoxy (see, e.g., Bush 2021). One example of this has been provided by re-
cent debates over the administration of universal credit and the provision of 
social security. As we have seen, one of the biggest risk factors associated with 
pandemic mortality has been deprivation but, in September 2021, the govern-
ment confirmed that it intended to remove the additional funding offered to 
the poorest families during the pandemic, despite fears that this would exac-
erbate existing poverty levels (BBC 2021a). 
The UK Government has also delivered mixed messages in its response to 
the need for international support. As we have already seen, the pace of vac-
cine roll-outs has varied enormously across the world. In 2021, the govern-
ment sought to take a leading role in worldwide efforts to boost vaccine up-
take in poorer countries (Johnson 2021). However, just over a month later, it 
confirmed its intention to renege on a previous manifesto commitment by 
reducing its commitment to foreign aid from 0.7 per cent of GDP to 0.5 per 
cent (Parkinson 2021). This was defended on the grounds that the pandemic 
had significantly reduced the size of the UK economy, even though that econ-
omy was still one of the largest in the world. 
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6. Conclusions 
The 1918/19 pandemic has now become famous as the “forgotten pandemic” 
(Crosby 1989). Laura Spinney (2018, 289-95) offered a number of explanations 
for this apparent act of collective (if not necessarily global) amnesia.11 In the 
first instance, she suggested that major historical events only become “mem-
orable” once a certain amount of time has passed. Secondly, most of those 
who contracted the disease experienced it in a relatively mild form and sub-
sequently recovered (see also Honigsbaum 2014, 225-6). A third possibility 
was that many people wanted to forget the pandemic because they wanted to 
forget the powerlessness it had exposed. In contrast, Niall Johnson (2006, 180) 
argued that the pandemic was “forgotten” because of its scale. As Dr Rieux 
had suggested in Albert Camus’s (2002, 31) famous novel, The plague, “a hun-
dred million bodies spread through history are just a mist drifting through 
the imagination.” 
It is, of course, far too soon to say whether the coronavirus pandemic will 
be similarly forgotten. In contrast to the “Spanish lady,” the measures taken 
to control the spread of infection have probably led to greater changes in peo-
ple’s lives and may therefore have a more lasting impact. However, as the 
experience of 1918/19 reminds us, many people have a strong desire to return 
to the comfort of familiar and well-trodden paths once the immediate danger 
has passed. 
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